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Abstract  A major lesson of the recent financial crisis is that money market freezes have major macroeconomic 
implications. This paper develops a tractable model in which we analyze the microeconomic and macroeconomic 
implications of a systemic banking crisis. In particular, we consider how the systemic crisis affects the optimal allocation of 
funding for businesses. We show that a central bank should reduce the interest rate to manage a systemic shock and hence 
smooth the macroeconomic consequences. Moreover, the analysis offers insight on the rational of bank behavior and the role 
of markets in a systemic crisis. We find that the failure to adopt the optimal policy can lead to economic fragility. 
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1. Introduction 
The appropriate policy response to a contagious banking 
crisis is the subject of continuing and recent debates. A 
standard view is that monetary policy should play a role 
only if the financial disruption affects inflation or the real 
economy. Thus, we should not use monetary policy to 
alleviate financial distress if this policy impairs inflation 
and output. But is this argument an economic rational or 
merely an ideology? 
The standard view of central banking is challenged by the 
policy response during the recent financial crisis Woodford 
and Curdia [15]. It turned out that low interest rates are an 
essential instrument for limiting the threats of financial 
distress, which finally helps to stabilize the real economy. 
In August 2007, interest rates in both the United States (US) 
and European Union (EU) were cut dramatically. However, 
this policy is also challenged by Martin [9] who argues that 
central banks should provide liquidity at a penalty rate, even 
in severe crisis due to moral hazard. 
In order to understand the implications of systemic 
effects and the optimal decision- making of firms, it is 
important to take into consideration the macroeconomic 
linkage in respect to an interbank market freeze. We first 
analyze the choice problem between direct and intermediate 
finance in normal times, and later on under market distress. 
Since in practice, issuing debt is less expensive than bank 
loans, loan applicants are usually considered as those who 
cannot issue debt in the market. However, in a systemic 
banking crisis this trivial argument is probably wrong. 
Therefore, we expect a coexistence of both types of  
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financial sources, however, with some bias to bond 
financing. 
This paper addresses the question: what is the optimal 
choice of financing in different states of the world. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 
presents a literature review. In Section 3, we build the 
model and discuss the results. Finally, section 4 concludes 
the paper. 
2. Literature Review 
The literature on systemic banking crises related to 
interbank markets, financing, and the micro-macro 
interaction is rather small. However, there is some related 
literature about the optimal allocation of bank loans and 
moral hazard. The work by Diamond [3], HolmstroÖm and 
Tirole [7] and Freixas and Jorge [5] show two important 
aspects relevant to our paper. Diamond [3] assumes limited 
participation of investors in the financial markets and 
justifies by this the coexistence of debt financing and bank 
loan financing. The limited participation implies that assets 
offered for sale in the market will not attract bids from all 
possible buyers and thus a lower sale price can be 
anticipated. As a consequence, they show that banks can 
emerge endogenously to solve the liquidity problem 
generated by limited participation. 
The contribution by HolmstrÖm and Tirole [7] studies 
directly the liquidity demand by firms. They show 
interesting results related to ours. This model shares a 
fundamental element with Diamond and Dybvig [4] that 
banks provide insurance against liquidity shocks. However, 
the demand for this insurance does not come from the risk 
aversion of depositors because in HolmstrÖm and Tirole [7] 
depositors are risk-neutral. The demand for liquidity 
insurance comes instead from firms, which are subject to 
moral hazard. The superiority of bank finance over direct or 
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market finance lies in the commitment possibilities that 
banks have, and financial markets typically do not have. An 
exception of this commitment possibility, however, can be 
seen in the derivatives and structured markets. Obviously, 
this market segment was at the origin of the US–subprime 
crisis of 2007, in particular the origination of mortgage 
backed securities (MBS) and collateralized debt obligations 
(CDOs). 
A further aspect was studied by Bhattacharya and Chiesa 
[2] in the banking literature. They argue that a bilateral 
bank- borrower relationship may be superior to multilateral 
lending. Similar arguments are modeled along the same 
lines by Yosha [16, 17]. Finally, Kashyap et al. [8] find a 
new explanation for traditional deposit taking and lending 
in banking due to economies of scales. They argue that loan 
commitments, the contracts by which banks allow firms to 
borrow liquidity when they need it, are very similar to 
demand deposit contracts. In particular, the liquidity 
reserves held by banks can also be used as a buffer against 
the risk that firms draw on their credit lines. Moreover, they 
show that banks with large amounts of deposits are more 
likely to offer loan commitments. 
However, during the recent contagious crisis in the US 
and Europe, Reinhart and Rogoff [13] argue ’this time is 
different’. In a severe systemic crisis the behavior of banks 
as well as firms may not follow standard economic 
rationales. Consequently, we have study these new 
feedback loops and linkages to the macro-economy. We 
analyze these aspects in our paper. The stylized model is a 
promising approach because it allows us to analyze these 
feedback loops. Thus, the paper attempts to extend the 
existing game-theoretic banking literature. 
Our model sets itself apart from the standard banking 
literature: Firstly, we define an optimal allocation problem 
in normal times and later on under market distress; i.e. in a 
systemic or contagious crisis. Secondly, the model is 
tractable to analyze different solution mechanisms, for 
instance a systemic risk fund. Moreover, we are able to 
study current regulatory proposals for systemically 
important financial institutions (SIFIs). Thirdly, we analyze 
the first- and second- best economic outcomes. Finally, we 
find new policy conclusions, based on the modeling, for the 
design of a systemic risk fund. 
3. Model 
Consider an economy in which firms with zero wealth 
implement random investment projects of an initial 
investment size normalized to 1. The return of investment is 
X  with probability θ  and zero otherwise. The firm has no 
other source of cash, so the repayment is zero if the 
investment fails. The riskless rate of interest is normalized to 
zero. Moreover, there is a continuum of such firms. However, 
there are two types of firms, good firms in a proportion Hν , 
which have a probability of success Hθ , and bad firms in a 
proportion of Lν , which have a probability of success Lθ . 
We assume that H Lθ θ≥  and  1   L HX X Xθ θ θ< < < , 
where we define 
= HH L Lν θ θθ ν+：  
This parameter constellation assumes that only good (firm) 
projets have a positive net present value. Moreover, we 
assume that the proportion of firms jν  vary according to 
the parameter ( )0,1jλ   where j J  with { },J H L≡ . 
Hence, in economically normal times there are more good 
than bad firms, H Lλ λ> . Hence, we obtain 
1H Hλ λ> −  or 1 / 2Hλ > . Firms of type j Hν =  or 
j Lν = , are exposed to the same idiosyncratic liquidity 
shocks, however, with different size, such as  
j
j
j
for j H
for j L
λ ε
ν
λ ε
− ==  + =   
Where 0ε ≥  represent a systemic liquidity shock and 
( )0,1ε . That shock spills over to the real economy and 
therefore changes the quality and proportion of both good as 
well as bad firms in our economy. 
Furthermore, we assume that a liquidity shock, 0ε ≥  
has an effect on the bank type: With a proportion of µ  
there are sound banks, i.e. banks fulfilling all capital 
requirements. The proportion of 1 µ−  denotes the number 
of unsound banks, i.e. undercapitalized banks with risky 
investments1. 
Additionally, we assume in the beginning a competitive 
banking industry. Investors are assumed to be risk-neutral 
and they cannot distinguish between the two types of firms 
without of costs. Later on, we assume a monitoring 
technology to identify firm’s type with sunk costs per firm of 
C  Finally, let LR  be the repayment on a bank loan by the 
firms and let γ  denote the proportion of good firms which 
are financing their investments via the market, i.e. corporate 
bonds. 
3.1. Model Discussion 
The analysis begins with benchmark results, in order to 
compare these with the nonstandard findings later on. First, 
we start with the nominal interest rate of a bond issued by a 
firm. 
Proposition 1. The nominal bond interest rate BR  is less 
than the expected project return X . 
Proof of Proposition 1. The bond has to repay an amount 
BR  such that 1BRθ = . This payment is feasible because 
1 Some people call these banks ”greedy”. 
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1
BR Xθ
= ≤  by the model assumption of 1 Xθ< . 
Now, we take into account the banking sector. By paying a 
sunk cost C  per firm at the initial period, banks are able to 
identify the firm’s type and then decide whether to lend. First 
under what conditions does the bank have an incentive to 
monitor the firm? Secondly, under what conditions will all 
good firms be attracted by competitive bank loan conditions? 
We define the probability of success of good firms that issue 
bonds as 
( ) : H H L L
H L
γν θ ν θ
θ γ
γν ν
+
=
+
          (1) 
where ( )θ γ  is the average probability of repayment. As 
intuition suggests, the average probability of repayment is 
increasing with the number of firms that issue bonds because 
only good firms are able to issue bonds. 
Proposition 2. ( )θ γ  is increasing in γ  or in 
mathematical terms: 
( )
0
d
d
θ γ
γ
> . 
Proof of Proposition 2. Calculate the first derivative of 
equation (1) in respect of γ : 
( ) ( )
( )2
0H L H L
H L
d
d
θ γ ν ν θ θ
γ γν ν
−
= >
+
 
From this idea we obtain the value of the bond market 
interest rate ( )BR γ . 
Lemma 1. The bond market interest rate is given as: 
(i) ( ) H LB
H H L L
R γν νγ
γν θ ν θ
+
=
+
 and 
(ii) ( )BR γ  is decreasing in γ . 
Proof 1. The proof of part (i) follows immediately by using 
( ) 1BRθ γ =  Part (ii) is proven by using the inverse of 
Proposition 2. 
Since 1L Xθ < , we obtain in normal times that the 
condition ( ) 1Xθ γ =  will be satisfied for some value 
ˆ 0γ > . Hence, banks will lend a certain amount that at least 
return the initial investment of 1. Of course, the bank lends 
only to good firms Hν . So the profit will be given by 
( )1 .H H LR Cν θ∏ = − −           (2) 
Individual rationality implies for all banks that they invest 
an amount of Hν , such as 
,H H L HR Cν θ ν≥ +              (3) 
So the zero-profit condition in the perfect competitive 
banking market becomes 
1
.HL
H
C
R ν
θ
+
=                 (4) 
Proposition 3. The repayment rate on a bank loan LR  
has the following properties: 
(i)  The higher the success probability Hθ  of the 
project, the lower the repayment rate LR . In other 
words: The better the firms’ solvency, the better the 
credit conditions. 
(ii)  The higher the screening costs C , the higher the 
repayment rate LR  on a bank loan. 
(iii) If the number of good firms Hν  is large, the 
corresponding repayment rate LR  is less, due to 
more good firms with less risk in our economy, and 
thus economies of scale. 
Proof of Proposition 3. The proofs can be demonstrated 
by using equation (4) 
Now, we are ready to describe the three equilibrium 
constellations in relation to the parameter γ ; i.e. the 
proportion of bond issuing firms. Firstly, there is a 
banks–only equilibrium where 0γ = . Secondly, the bond 
market only equilibrium where 1γ = , and thirdly the 
mixed (bank and market) equilibrium where ( )0,1γ . 
Next, let me derive the three different equilibrium 
conditions. Banks–only equilibrium condition ( )0γ = : The 
condition for such an equilibrium to exist requires: 
LR X≤ ; i.e. the loan is feasible. And ( )0L BR R≤ ; i.e. 
the loan is more attractive for borrowers. Since 0γ =  in 
the banks–only equilibrium the market for bonds does not 
exist or equivalently ( )0BR X> . Hence, only the first 
constraint is relevant. Using the zero-profit condition eq. (3), 
we obtain 
1.H
H
C Xθ
ν
≤ −                (5) 
Bonds–only equilibrium condition ( )1γ = : Here, the 
condition is reversed, i.e. ( )1B LR R X≤ ≤ . Using the 
competitive values for ( )1BR  and LR , the condition 
becomes 
1
1 ,H
H
C
ν
θ θ
+
≤                 (6) 
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or equivalently, 
1 .H
H
Cθ
θ ν
− ≤                (7) 
Mixed equilibrium condition: The mixed equilibrium is 
the interior solution in other words. The interior solution 
exists, in case of ( )L BR R γ= , which implies finally  
1
.H H L L H
H L H
C
γν θ ν θ ν
γν ν θ
+
+
=
+
          (8) 
The unique solution of equation (8) is demonstrated in the 
following Lemma. 
Lemma 2. The unique γ  results in 
( ) LL H L L
H
H
C
C
νν θ θ θ
ν
γ
θ
− −
=          (9) 
Proof 2. The proof is the solution of equation (8) in 
respect of γ  
These findings offer interesting insights: Conditions (5) 
and (7) depend upon different parameters. It is possible that 
neither of them are satisfied (no funding to firms). In fact, 
this will occur when screening costs are too expensive and 
the proportion of good firms is too small. Otherwise, 
screening costs per unit are within the following interval 
1 ., 1H H
H
C Xθ θ
ν θ
 


− − 

           (10) 
Hence, this condition describes the range of mixed 
equilibria. The next proposition summarizes the uniqueness 
and existence of the three equilibria conditions in our model. 
Proposition 4. There are three different equilibria 
conditions: 
(i) Banks–only equilibrium: The screening cost per unit 
of loan that is granted should be smaller with respect to 
the project’s present net value. 
(ii) Bonds–only equilibrium: The monitoring costs per 
unit of loan have to be excessively larger in comparison 
to the gains from screening; that allows an increase of a 
default probability of θ  to a probability of Hθ . 
(iii) Mixed equilibrium: The screening costs per unit of 
loans are in an interval determined by condition (10). 
Proof of Proposition 4. The existence proof of the 
equilibria conditions is divided in three parts: Part (i) and 
Part (ii) is trivial because part (i) follows directly from 
condition (5), and part (ii) follows immediately from 
condition (7). In part (iii), we use Lemma 1 together with 
part (ii). This proves the existence of the mixed equilibria, 
such as 
( ) ( )
1
ˆ1 HB B
H
C
R R Xν γ
θ
+
< < =  
3.2. Macroeconomics 
To evaluate the aggregate output for the three equilibria 
constellations, we aggregate the output over all firms and 
banks. All firms receive funding, if the firm is of type Hν  
with a success probability in the interval [ ],1Hθ . The total 
output in the banks–only solution will be 
( ) ( )
1
ˆ ˆ1 ,
H
H X C dF
θ
ν θ θ − − ∫        (11) 
where ( )ˆF θ  is a distribution function with ( )ˆ 0F θ′ >  
for all [ ]ˆ ,1Hθ θ . Hence, ( )ˆF θ  measures the proportion 
of good firms who’s success probability is above the 
threshold. 
Within the bonds–only equilibrium a fraction of negative 
net present value is implemented and the total output will be 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1
ˆ 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ1 .
H
H L
H H
L L L H
X
X C dF dF
θ
θ θ
ν θ
ν θ θ θ
 −
− − − 
∫ ∫
       (12) 
In case of the interior solution, the output will be 
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
ˆ ˆ1 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ1 1 2 .
H
H L
H H L L
H H L H
X X
X C dF dF
θ
θ θ
γ ν θ ν θ
γ ν θ θ θ
 − − −
+ − − − 
∫ ∫
(13) 
The last expression offers an interesting insight. 
Proposition 5. The mixed equilibrium is less efficient in 
comparison to bonds–only or banks–only equilibria due to 
duplication of screening costs. 
Proof of Proposition 5. The duplication of screening 
costs appears because firms identified as good will choose 
the bond market, despite the sunk costs of C . Consequently, 
the bonds–only or banks–only equilibria is more efficient for 
firms dependent on the type. The banks–only equilibrium 
which is servicing firms of type Lν  is efficient, if and only if 
( )1L LC Xν θ< −  
The last condition illustrates the case with lower 
monitoring costs than revenues for the inefficient firms of 
type Lν . The bonds–only equilibrium is efficient in the 
opposite case. 
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3.3. Systemic Crisis 
In the following subsection, we include a systemic (shock) 
parameter ε in our standard model. We analyze the 
consequences in the three equilibrium constellations and the 
macroeconomic implications. Firstly, we describe the 
banks–only equilibrium. Using the zero-profit condition for 
banks, we obtain 
1 .H
H
CXθ
λ ε
− ≥
−
           (14) 
In case of a sufficiently large shock 0ε  , and Hλ  on 
the lower bound of the interval 
1 ;1
2
 
  
, the right-hand side 
of equation (14), convergences to infinity. Hence, the 
likelihood of the banks–only equilibrium is close to zero 
because the left-hand side, rep- resented by the net present 
value, is relatively small in a systemic crisis. Reason is the 
low success probability Hθ  and low out- put X  during a 
systemic crisis. In other words, in a systemic crisis the 
profitability and net present value (NPV) is too low, and 
hence there exists no banks–only equilibrium. Let me 
summarize this finding in the next proposition. 
Proposition 6. The banks–only equilibrium is less 
accessible during a systemic crisis. 
Proof of Proposition 6. Equation (14) 
This proposition demonstrates the fundamental problem 
during a systemic crisis or a sovereign debt crisis, such as in 
the Euro Area. In a systemic crisis, despite cheap refinancing 
conditions and low interest rates by central banks, almost all 
banks–only equilibria are eliminated. Thus central banks 
can not solve the financing problem alone. Again, the 
reasons are the high monitoring costs and the relatively low 
profitability of firms. Second, we illustrate the bonds–only 
equilibrium. Now, we rearrange equation (7) and obtain 
1 .H
H
Cθ
λ εθ
− ≤
−
           (15) 
In case of large systemic shocks 0ε  , the right-hand 
side will be large. Hence, the bonds–only equilibrium is 
easier to target and thus more likely. The question which 
remains open however is, whether there is sufficient demand 
of corporate bonds during a systemic crisis. 
Proposition 7. The bonds–only equilibrium is more 
accessible for firms in a systemic crisis. 
Proof of Proposition 7. Equation (15) 
However, due to market distress in a systemic crisis there 
is a weaker demand for bonds and other financial products. 
Consequently, putting together the result of Proposition 6 
and Proposition 7, the mixed market equilibrium is most 
likely in a systemic crisis and this is despite the lower 
efficiency of the mixed equilibrium according to proposition 
5. 
Before, studying the output implications, we address the 
following question: How can we get back to the standard 
banks– only equilibrium with higher welfare, even during a 
systemic crisis? Additionally, this is important for small and 
medium enter- prises with no access to the bond markets. 
Usually banks like to finance firms, because banks prefer 
debt finance due to higher profit margins in general. Bond 
issuing via banks is less attractive. 
Let 
H
S
λς  be an individual contribution from banks into a 
so-called’ systemic risk fund’. The whole fund is also 
guaranteed by the government and the fund is set up before 
the crisis; i.e. in period 0t = . All payments are collected 
and the systemic risk fund is accessible if and only if there 
is a systemic crisis. Now the new banks-only equilibrium 
with a systemic risk fund yields 
( ) ( )
H
S
h H HX Cλλ ε θ ς λ ε− + ≥ − +     (16) 
or 
( )
( )
1 .H
S
H
H
C
X λ
ς
θ
λ ε
−
− ≥
−
         (17) 
Thus, the systemic risk fund reduce the monitoring costs. 
Hence, the banks–only equilibrium is more likely, if the 
H
S
λς  is sufficiently large in comparison to the monitoring 
costs. In the optimum, we obtain 
H
SC λς= . Intuitively, the 
risk fund is a kind of insurance for banks, and simultaneously 
an insurance for the overall economy because it sustains the 
best equilibrium constellation even in crises times. Thus, the 
systemic risk fund can be seen as an explicit increase in the 
banks’ mark-up, and hence a rise of profitability for banks in 
a systemic crisis. 
Proposition 8. A systemic risk fund ensures the existence 
of the standard financing equilibrium. 
Proof of Proposition 8. Trivial derivation of condition 
(17) 
To obtain the standard equilibrium despite a systemic 
crisis, is in the interest of firms, banks, and the overall 
society due to macroeconomic efficiency. Furthermore, the 
good quality banks in our economy, with proportion µ , use 
the optimal zero-profit condition in equation (16). In other 
words, they screen the successful companies and provide 
financing only to them. However at the same time, there are 
more risky or bad quality banks, in proportion of 1 µ− . 
They provide money to more risky firms with lower success 
probability and calculate the profits with the average success 
probability θ . Hence, in the banks–only equilibrium we 
obtain 
( )( ) ( ) .L L H H Hv X Cθ λ ε θ λ ε+ − ≥ − +    (18) 
In terms of a perfect systemic shock 0Hε λ= >  it 
simplifies to 
( )
.
L L
CX
v θ
≥                (19) 
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Suppose a systemic crisis increases the number of less 
profitable firms ceteris paribus, what will happen? 
Proposition 9. The banks–only equilibrium in a systemic 
crisis is more attractive for unsound banks. 
Proof of Proposition 9. The proof is by comparing the 
left-hand side of condition (18) in terms of a large systemic 
shock: 
( )
( )( )
( )
( )
H H
H HL L H H
C C
v
λ ε λ ε
λ ε θθ λ ε θ
− + − +
≤
−+ −
 
which is true due to the additional factor in the denominator 
on the left-hand side by L Lv θ  
The higher the proportion of risky or greedy banks, the 
more likely is a banks–only equilibrium even in a systemic 
crisis. The optimal individual behavior of the different bank 
types’ imply interesting output consequences. Next, we 
calculate the output for a perfect systemic shock. 
Proposition 10. The welfare, W , of the economy in the 
banks–only equilibrium, during a perfect systemic shock, is 
dependent on the banks type and characterized by i jW W> . 
In case of i, i.e. 0µ = , there are unsound banks, and in 
equilibrium j , there are sound banks. 
Proof of Proposition 10. Calculate the respective output 
functions 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )1
1 1
for
for
H
L
H
i L
j
W V X C dF
W CdF
θ
θ
θ
µ θ θ
µ
µ θ
µ
 = − − −   
 
            = 0
= −  
            = 0
∫
∫
 
The comparison of both functions yields, 0i jW W≥ ≥  
Hence, during a systemic shock the equilibrium in terms 
of macroeconomic output is more efficient if there are 
unsound banks. The reason for this is that unsound or risky 
banks provide more financing than the sound banks in 
particular in a systemic crisis. This phenomenon is known as 
the gambling of resurrection [6]. But this abnormal finding 
might help to sustain the macroeconomy. 
3.4. Policy Response 
Now we analyze the policy response of fiscal and 
monetary policy in regard to a systemic crisis. We assume 
that the bank refinance its investments Hv  by the collection 
of α  money from deposit holders and 1 α−  from the 
interbank market. The bank has to pay an interest rate DR  
to the deposit holders and MMR  to the institutions in the 
money market or the central bank. Given only sound banks, 
we obtain 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )( )
1
1 1 .
H H H D
MM
X R
R C
λ ε θ λ ε α
α
− ≥ − + +
+ + − +
    (20) 
In normal times, 0ε =  and ( )1 1Hλ α α= + − = , and 
thus 
( )2 .H MM D MMX R R R Cθ α≥ + + − +    (21) 
For an efficient equilibrium, we have to minimize the 
right-hand side. 
Proposition 11. The optimal policy in normal times 
equals 0α =  and 0MMR →   
Proof of Proposition 11. Substitute 0α =  0 and 
0MMR →  minimizes the right-hand side in equation (21) 
It implies that banks refinance the loans completely via the 
interbank market or the central bank. Here they just have to 
pay the interbank interest rate MMR , which is close to zero. 
If there is a systemic shock, the condition (20) changes to 
( )0 1 .MM D MMR R R Cα≥ + + − +       (22) 
Proposition 12. There is no feasible refinancing 
banks–only equilibrium in a systemic crisis. 
Proof of Proposition 12. The left-hand side of equation 
(22) is always positive even if 0α =  and the 0MMR =  0. 
There are always screening costs C  and fix costs. Thus, 
without a systemic risk fund there is no feasible banks–only 
equilibrium in a systemic crisis. 
Consequently, proposition (12) demonstrates that a 
systemic crisis must be tackled by joined fiscal and monetary 
policy. 
Hence, refinancing via deposit or interbank markets is 
difficult during a systemic crisis. This finding was prevalent 
in the past financial and economic crisis of 2007 to 2009. To 
remedy this disequilibrium constellation, we have to look for 
new mechanisms. We find an argument in favor of a 
systemic risk fund. Propositions (12) and (13) show that the 
interest rate cut by monetary policy to zero are a necessary, 
however, not sufficient condition during a systemic crisis. 
Although we cannot integrate all findings into a 
macro-economic model, our results suggest that joined fiscal 
and monetary policy is necessary in a systemic crisis. In 
addition, our findings are related to similar recent 
quantitative findings by Pindyck and Wang [11] and studies 
by Posner [12], Parson [10], Sunstein [14] and Allison [1]. 
These studies show that the risk of a national or global 
catastrophe is significant and should be taken more seriously. 
In particular, policymakers should devote greater resources 
to reduce the tail risk of a crisis. Our proposal is the 
implementation of a mandatory systemic risk fund which is 
established for all banks by all banks. 
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4. Conclusions 
The systemic and especially macroeconomic aspects of 
financial crises remain unrecognized in the existing banking 
and finance literature. We develop a model that discusses 
thoroughly these aspects and the economic implications. In 
this paper, we identify new conditions for the optimal 
financing equilibrium in a systemic crisis. To tackle the 
problem of a credit market freeze during a contagious crisis, 
we propose to cut the interest rates and to utilize the idea of a 
systemic risk fund. Our model, however, has also limitations: 
(1) we do not look for alternatives, such as an enhanced 
macro-prudential regulation. (2) the model does not tackle 
the too-big-to-fail problem. Nevertheless, the model is 
tractable and informative with innovative insights for the 
current regulatory debate. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I thank the Editor and two anonymous referees for their 
helpful comments and suggestions. Research is funded by 
the RRI - Reutlingen Research Institute. This support is 
greatly appreciated. 
 
REFERENCES 
[1] Allison, G. (2004). Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate 
Preventable Catastrophe. Henry Holt & Company. 
[2] Bhattacharya, S. and Chiesa, G. (1995). Proprietary 
information, financial intermediation and research incentives. 
Journal of Financial Intermediation, 4:328– 357. 
[3] Diamond, D. (1997). Liquidity, banks, and markets. Journal 
of Political Economy, 105(5):928–956. 
[4] Diamond, D. and Dybvig, P. (1983). Bank runs, deposit 
insurance, and liquidity. Journal of Political Economy, 91(3): 
401–419. 
[5] Freixas, X. and Jorge, J. (2008). The role of interbank makrets 
in monetary policy: A model with rationing. JOurnla of 
Money, Credit and Banking, 40(6):1151–1176. 
[6] Hellwig, M. (1995). Systemic aspects of risk management in 
banking and finance. Swiss Journal of Economics and Statis- 
tics, 131(4/2):723–737. 
[7] HolmstrÖm, B. and Tirole, J. (1998). Private and public 
supply of liquidity. Journal of Political Economy, 106(1):1– 
40. 
[8] Kashyap, A., Rajan, R., and Stein, J. (1999). Banks as 
liquidity providers: An explanation for the co-existence of 
lending and deposit taking. Discussion Paper, SSN, (156748). 
[9] Martin, A. (2009). Reconciling bagehot and the fed’s 
response to september 11. Journal of Money, Credit, and 
Banking, 41:397–415. 
[10] Parson, E. A. (2007). A review of richard posner’s 
catastrophe: Risk and response. Journal of Economic 
Literature, 45:147–164. 
[11] Pindyck, R. and Wang, N. (2009). The economic and policy 
consequences of catastrophes. MIT Sloan School Working 
Paper, (4751-09):1–26. 
[12] Posner, R. A. (2004). Catastrophe: Risk and Response. 
Oxford Universtiy Press. 
[13] Reinhart, C. M. and Rogoff, K. S. (2011). This Time Is 
Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly. Princeton. 
[14] Sunstein, C. R. (2007). Worst-Case Scenarios. Harvard 
University Press. 
[15] Woodford, M. and Curdia, V. (2010). Credit spreads and 
monetary policy. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 
42(1):3–25. 
[16] Yosha, O. (1995a). Arm’s length financing and competition 
in product markets: A welfare analysis. Discussion Pa- per, 
Tel Avivi University, Israel. 
[17] Yosha, O. (1995b). Information disclosure costs and the 
choice of financing source. Journal of Financial 
Intermediation, 4:3–20. 
 
